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THE TEXAS HEALTH CARE LIABILITY ACT:
TEXAS IS THE FIRST STATE TO LISTEN TO
THE CONCERNS OF ITS HEALTH CARE




In 1989, several months after becoming pregnant, Florence Cor-
coran was ordered to bed rest until she delivered her baby.' When her
physician subsequently determined that the pregnancy was at high risk
and the fetus required constant monitoring, he ordered her hospital-
ized. 2 Because Mrs. Corcoran's insurance plan mandated advance ap-
proval for overnight monitoring at a hospital, her hospitalization was
presented to the party responsible for making such determinations.
3
When the responsible party denied certification, Mrs. Corcoran was
forced to return home where she later miscarried.4 Mr. and Mrs. Cor-
coran filed suit against the insurance company and the medical review
organization, seeking damages for the wrongful death of their child,
but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found the
claims to be pre-empted by the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA).5 The Corcorans were left without a remedy against the
responsible parties.
In contrast, when Darryl Dukes attempted to obtain post-operative
blood tests on the orders of his doctor, the hospital rejected his pre-
* B.A. 1995, Georgetown University; J.D. 1999, Catholic University of
America Columbus School of Law.
1. See Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1322 (5th Cir.
1992).
2. See id. at 1322-23.
3. See id. at 1324.
4. See id
5. See id at 1331-35.
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scription for the laboratory tests; Mr. Dukes did not obtain these tests
until a day later, at which time his condition had already worsened.6
Dukes later died, the level of sugar in his blood at the time of his death
was extremely high.7 Mrs. Dukes filed suit, seeking to hold the health
maintenance organization (HMO), among others, liable for failing to
exercise reasonable care in selecting and monitoring its medical per-
sonnel.8 Unlike the Corcorans, who were left without a remedy, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit granted Mrs.
Dukes, at a minimum, access to a remedy when it held ERISA did not
pre-empt her claims. 9
The lawsuits brought by the Corcorans and Mrs. Dukes are just two
of the many cases health plan participants have brought against their
insurance companies within the last ten years, in efforts to gain some
measure of protection and remedy against managed care entities.' 0 The
mistrust and skepticism by health care consumers of the managed care
system is evidenced in a survey conducted by the Kaiser Foundation
and Harvard University." The survey revealed that seventy-eight per-
cent of participants favored requiring health plans and insurers to pro-
vide more consumer protections. 2 The survey also indicated that the
6. See Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 352 (3rd Cir. 1995).
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id. at 356.
10. See cases discussed infra Part I. C.
11. See American Political Network, Vol. 6, Sept. 17, 1998.
12. See id. In addition, The Commonwealth Fund Survey of Patient Expe-
riences with Managed Care conducted in 1994, revealed that of those health
care consumers who were enrolled in employer-provided health insurance and
had an option of enrolling in a managed care plan had higher levels of dissatis-
faction and lower quality of care than those enrolled in plans with services paid
for by insurance companies. See Managed Care Quality: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Health and Environment of the House Comm. on Commerce,
105
th Cong. 67 (1998) (statement of Karen Davis, President, The Common-
wealth Fund). A greater number of patients with managed care found the
quality of services and physicians to be worse than those not in managed care
organizations. See id. A 1997 poll of 1,000 Americans revealed that seventy-
four percent were concerned that managed care plans often delayed or denied
treatment to patients. See Managed Care Quality: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Health and Environment of the House Comm. On Commerce, 105
h
Cong. 108 (1998) (statement of David E. Herbert on behalf of The Patient Ac-
cess to Responsible Care Alliance). Furthermore, this poll showed that eighty-
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prevalent issue on the minds of American voters during 1998 mid-term
elections was the regulation of HMOs and other health plans.' 3 Forty-
two percent of respondents characterized HMOs as "bad."' 14 A desire
to gain more regulation and control over the managed care system also
was apparent. 15 In a similar survey conducted by CNN and Time, sixty-
three percent of the respondents stated they favored the right to sue
health plans.'
6
Despite a strong desire to sue health plans over medical treatment
decisions made by managed care entities, many health plan members
find themselves encountering problems similar to the Corcorans.'
7
Texas legislators listened to its citizens' 8 by enacting the Texas Health
Care Liability Act (Act) in 1997.19 One year later, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas partially upheld the
protection granted to health plan members by ruling that enrollees
could sue their HMOs for its health care treatment decisions.20 Al-
though the court's decision permitted a health plan member to sue his
nine percent favored the passage of congressional legislation allowing health
care consumers to appeal the decisions of the managed care organization. See
id.
13. See American Political Network, Vol. 6, Sept. 17, 1998.
14. See id.; see also Barbara A. Noah, The Managed Care Dilemma: Can
Theories of Tort Liability Adapt to the Realities of Cost Containment, 48
MERCER L. REv. 1219, 1220 (1997) (stating that most Americans view the care
provided by managed care entities as inferior to care rendered by traditional
means).
15. See American Political Network, supra note 13. Fifty-four percent of
the respondents stated that they would support giving health plan members the
right to sue their health plans, even if such regulation would result in increased
costs. See id.
16. See American Political Network, Vol. 6, July 7, 1998.
17. See cases discussed infra Part I C.
18. See Texas: HMOs Would Be Liable for Negligent Decisions Under
Proposed Legislation, 6 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 6, at d26 (Feb. 6, 1997).
19. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 88.001-88.003 (West 1998).
20. See Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Insurance, 12 F.
Supp. 2d 597 (S.D. Tex. 1998). Note that both the plaintiffs and the state have
filed notices of appeal with respect to the decision issued by the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas. See Wayne J. Guglielmo, A
Court Muddies the Water for HMO Liability, MEDICAL ECONOMICS, Jan. 11,
1999, at 41. Many anticipate that this case will eventually be heard by the
United States Supreme Court. See Karen Foerstel, Texas' HMO Liability Law:
The Jury is Still Out, 57 CONG. Q. 381, 384 (1999).
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or her HMO for damages under the Act resulting from the quality of
medical care, it also held that a legal claim based upon a denial of a
benefit could not be brought under the Act.2' The question thus re-
mains as to how much protection health care consumers in Texas truly
have been afforded, compared to how much protection they truly want.
This Note is generally concerned with the status of ERISA pre-
emption and medical malpractice claims in Texas as a result of the
Texas Health Care Liability Act. Part I examines the shield protecting
the HMOs, beginning with a focus upon the structure of an HMO.
Next, this Note examines ERISA and how HMOs have used the fed-
eral law as a source of immunity. The Note then discusses various
court decisions on the issue of HMO liability based on claims ad-
dressing the quality of care or the quantity of benefits rendered by the
HMO. Part II of the Note analyzes how the Act subjects managed care
entities to liability for the medical treatment decisions they make.
This discussion will also examine the district court's holding in Cor-
porate Health Ins. Inc. v. Texas Dep 't of Ins.22 where a managed care
entity sought a declaration that ERISA pre-empt s the Act. In addition,
this Note parses the facts of the first case filed against an HMO under
the Act. Finally, Part III explores the effects that the Act and the deci-
sion upholding the Act may have on affording protection to health care
consumers and predicts the likely outcome of the first case brought
under the Act. The Note concludes by suggesting that Texas health
care consumers have not received the protections they have demanded.
1. THE SHIELD OF PROTECTION FOR THE HMO
A. The Structure of the HMO
The liability that may be imposed upon a managed care
23 entity 24
21. See Corporate Health Ins., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 597.
22. 12 F. Supp. 2d 597 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
23. See Denise Chan, ERISA Pre-emption: Immunity for HMOS, 98 U. ILL.
L. REv. 199, 200 (1998) (stating that managed care "refers to the incorporation
of various administrative procedures to limit consumption of health care.").
24. See Amy K. Fehn, Are We Protected From HMO Negligence?: An Ex-
amination of Ohio Law, ERISA Pre-emption, and Legislative Initiatives, 30
AKRON L. REv. 501, 505 (1997) ("A managed health care organization is a
general term used to define any healthcare insurer which seeks to 'manage' the
health care decisions of its patient/insured and physician/provider."). The
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for its decisions is closely connected to the type of entity to which that
member belongs. 25 The HMO,26 one of the various types of managed
care organizations, 27 became increasingly prevalent within the health
care industry between 1970 and 1990.28 During that time, enrollment
in HMOs grew from approximately 3.6 million persons to more than
thirty-five million. 29 As of 1996, approximately sixty million Ameri-
cans were enrolled in HMOs. 30 More recently, enrollment in managed
managed health care system and organization is in contrast to the traditional
"fee-for-service" model, in which the insurer does not take part in the decision
process regarding medical treatment for the patient. See id.
25. See William A. Chittenden, III, Malpractice Liability and Managed
Health Care: History and Prognosis, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 451, 452 (1991);
Noah, supra note 14, at 1223.
26. The typical HMO commonly falls into one of three categories. See
Chittenden, supra note 25, at 452-53. An HMO may be characterized as a
"staff model," in which the HMO employs its own physicians, pays the salaries
of these physicians and often owns or leases the health care facilities in which
the treatment by these physicians is rendered. See id. at 452; Chan, supra note
23, at 203. Secondly, the "Independent Practice Association" (IPA) model-
HMO typically contracts with a specific association of physicians; the physi-
cian members of this association render treatment to the HMO enrollees while
also dedicating a portion of their practice to patients who are not enrollees in
that particular HMO. See Chittenden, supra note 25, at 452; Chan, supra note
23, at 203. Finally, in the group model HMO, the HMO will often contract
with individual medical groups, which may also treat non-HMO enrollees, to
provide treatment for the HMO members. See Chittenden, supra note 25, at
452; Chan, supra note 23, at 203.
27. See Chan, supra note 23, at 200. Other managed care organizations
include preferred provider organizations (PPOs) and private insurance plans
that utilize specific structures to control the distribution of services. See id.
28. See Ryan Steven Johnson, ERISA Doctor in the House? The
Duty to Disclose Physician Incentives to Limit Health Care, 82 MINN. L. REV.
1631, 1638 (1998).
29. See id. at 1638.
30. See id.; Amy Stoeckl, Refusing to Follow Doctor's Orders: Texas
Takes the First Step in Holding HMOs Liable for Bad Medical Decisions, 18
N. ILL. U. L. REv. 387, 389 (1998) (stating that because of the increased cost
of medical care, the number of managed care organizations has simultaneously
increased with approximately 150 million people enrolled in such organiza-
tions). Other estimates have the number of people enrolled in ERISA plans at
124 million. See Karen A. Jordan, Pre-emption of a State "Legislatively Cre-
ated" Right to Sue HMOs for Negligence, HEALTH CARE LAW MONTHLY, April
1999, at 13. Central to the purpose behind the implementation and increase in
20001
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care organizations continues to increase.31 Approximately seventy-
three percent of Americans are enrolled in such organizations.
3 2
The transition from the traditional fee-for-service model 33 of health
care not only changed the way patients receive health care, but also
changed the physician's role in rendering treatment.34 Specifically,
under HMOs, patients have lost the freedom to choose a physician.
35
At the same time, physicians have lost the freedom to choose which
treatments to render and to control the cost of those treatments.36 The
HMOs and other managed care organizations is the effort to restrict or contain.
the costs associated with the delivery of health care and medical treatment. See
Fehn, supra note 24, at 505. The HMO's cost reduction elements are why
many HMOs are facing lawsuits. See id. Specifically, in an effort to contain
health care costs, many HMOs rely on methods such as utilization review,
gatekeeping and physician incentives. See id. Utilization review requires that a
treating physician submit the recommended treatment for review; and the
HMO determines whether such treatment is proper and necessary. See Chan,
supra note 23, at 204; see Fehn, supra note 24, at 505. The process of gate-
keeping involves primary care physicians who decide when more advanced
medical care is necessary. See id, at 506. These primary care physicians are
often subject to financial incentives implemented by the HMO to keep the level
of medical services to a minimum. See id. at 507. However, the efforts to
contain the costs associated with health care may result in medical services not
being rendered to a deserving patient in an effort to save money; this may have
dire and legal consequences for the managed care organization. See Chan, su-
pra note 23, at 205.
31. See Johnson, supra note 28, at 1638.
32. See id. Furthermore, approximately sixty percent of American physi-
cians have contracted with HMOs to provide medical services. See id.
33. The "fee-for-service" model involves the doctors receiving compensa-
tion from the insurer after the service has been rendered to the patient. See id.
at 1635, n. 26.
34. See id. at 1635.
35. See id.
36. See id. HMOs are both paying for the medical care and becoming
managers of the medical care. See Angela M. Easley, A Call to Congress to
Amend ERISA Pre-emption of HMO Medical Malpractice Claims: The Dissat-
isfactory Distinction Between Quality and Quantity of Care, 20 CAMPBELL L.
REV. 293, 314 (1998). The general concept behind the HMO places the plan in
a dual role of acting as both the insurer and the health care provider. See Noah,
supra note 14, at 1223. Specifically, one who enrolls in an HMO pays a fee in
exchange for primary care and acute care for a specific period of time. See id.
This fee is set and does not vary with the amount of services that the enrollee
may receive during that period. See id. The treatment to the enrolled patient is
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loss of the active roles for both the patient and the physician reflects
the rationing of health care that often causes patients to become criti-
cal of the managed care organization system.37 In addition, because
managed care organizations have entered into the arena of medical de-
cision-making, the question arises whether an HMO should be held li-
able when its decisions affect the treatment a patient receives. 38
B. ERISA Pre-emption Protection
Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 to protect employees from abu-
"sive tactics in the management of employee pension plans. 9 Until
ERISA, such abusive tactics included inadequate minimum standards,
insufficient funds from which employee benefits could be paid, and
the termination of a plan prior to the accumulation of funds.40 Al-
though ERISA applies to the maintenance of employee benefit plans
and imposes standards and obligations on those plans, it does not re-
quire employers to implement such benefit plans. 41 ERISA's stated
purpose was "to protect employees by requiring disclosure and re-
porting, setting forth standards of conduct for fiduciaries, requiring
vesting of benefits, setting minimum standards of funding, and re-
quiring plan termination insurance. 42 ERISA permits an employee to
bring suit against an employee benefit plan and allows the federal
government to regulate and oversee these plans.43
Congress' desire to provide uniform regulation and close monitor-
ing of employee benefit plans is clearly evident in the pre-emption
rendered by a physician or other health care entity that has contracted with that
particular HMO to provide care. See id.
37. See Michelle M. Kwon, Move Over Marcus Welby, MD. and Make
Way for Managed Care: The Implications of Capitation, Gag Clauses, and
Economic Credentialing, 28 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 829, 830-31 (1997). Some
critics of this rationing of health care argue that it is in direct contrast to the
health care system. See id. at 831.
38. See Chan, supra note 23, at 205.
39. See id. at 207.
40. See L. Frank Coan, Jr., You Can't Get There From Here - Question-
ing the Erosion of ERISA Pre-emption in Medical Malpractice Actions Against
HMOs, 30 GA. L. REV. 1023, 1037 (1996).
41. See id. at 1037-38.
42. Chan, supra note 23, at 208.
43. See Coan, supra note 36, at 1037-38.
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provision. 44 The statute provides that ERISA "shall supersede any and
all State laws insofar as they .. relate to any employee benefit
plan . . ."4 In order to determine whether ERISA pre-empt s a state
law, a court must conduct a two-step inquiry. 46 First, the court must
determine whether the specific plan under attack by the employee is an
employee benefit plan, thus rendering ERISA applicable to the
matter. 47 If the court determines that an ERISA plan is at issue, the
second inquiry is whether the cause of action brought before the court
"relate[s] to" that employee benefit plan as defined by ERISA 8
Regarding the first prong of the ERISA analysis, ERISA defines an
employee welfare benefit plan, which includes health benefits plans,
as:
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is
hereinafter established or maintained by an employer or
by an employee organization, or by both to the extent
that such plan, fund or program was established or is
maintained for the purpose of providing for its partici-
pants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of in-
surance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital
care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, ac-
cident, disability ...
In essence, this inquiry involves determining whether "from the sur-
rounding circumstances a reasonable person can ascertain the intended
benefits, class of beneficiaries, the source of financing, and the proce-
dures for receiving benefits." 50 Further, the court must determine
whether that particular plan is part of an employment relationship by
examining how much participation the employer has on the imple-
44. See id. at 1038.
45. Corporate Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 607 (citing 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(a)
(West 1985)).
46. See Coan, supra note 40, at 1038; The Corporate Health Insurance
court followed this two-step process in evaluating whether ERISA pre-empt s
the Act. See Corporate Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 608-612.
47. See Corporate Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 608; Coan, supra note 40, at
1038.
48. See Corporate Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 610; Coan, supra note 40, at
1038.
49. Corporate Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 608 (citing 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(1)
(West Supp. 1998)).
50. Id. (quoting Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1371, 1373 (11th
Cir. 1982)).
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mentation and management of the benefit plan.51
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas,
in evaluating ERISA's application to the Act, noted a comprehensive
analysis for the first prong of the pre-emption test subsequently used
by the Fifth Circuit.5 2 The test required an examination of whether a
plan: "(1) exists; (2) falls within the safe-harbor provision established
by the Department of Labor (DoL); and (3) satisfies the primary ele-
ments of an ERISA 'employee benefit plan' - establishment or main-
tenance by an employer intending to benefit employees." 53 If the court
finds that any of these requirements are not met, the plan does not fall
within ERISA's provisions.54 In making this analysis, the court must
examine the statutory language, Congress' intent in enacting this lan-
guage, and any interpretation by the DoL. 55
The second prong of the pre-emption analysis entails examining
whether the state law relates to the ERISA plan. 56 Specifically, the
court must look to whether the state law is connected with or refer-
ences the plan at issue.57 ERISA pre-emption may occur even though
the state law does not directly affect or make specific reference to the
58plan at issue.
In New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers' Ins. Co., 59 the United States Supreme Court addressed the
approach required to evaluate whether a state law relates to an ERISA
plan for pre-emption purposes. 60 The Court noted that because the lan-
guage of ERISA was not helpful in determining its meaning, it must
look to Congress' objectives and intentions to determine whether a
state law relates to a plan. 61 The Travelers' Court stated Congress'
51. See id. (quoting Peckham v. Gem State Mut. of Utah, 964 F.2d 1043,
1049 (10th Cir. 1992)).
52. See id. (citing In Meredith v. Time Ins. Co., 980 F.2d 352, 355 (5th
Cir. 1993)).
53. Id.
54. See Corporate Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 610.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id. (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97
(1983)).
58. See id. (quoting CIGNA Healthplan of La., Inc. v. Louisiana, 82 F.3d
642, 647 (5th Cir. 1996)).
59. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
60. See id.
61. See Corporate Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 611 (citing New York State
2000]
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objective was to assure that employers would not be subject to con-
flicting or non-uniform state regulations.
62
Whether a plaintiffs claim can survive ERISA pre-emption depends
largely on the type of action or the theory of liability on which the
case is brought.63 Traditionally, plaintiffs have sought to hold HMOs
liable for medical malpractice under two broad theories:64 (1) negli-
gence of their medical personnel under respondeat superior or "osten-
sible agency" (if a patient receives care under the belief he or she is
receiving that care from the HMO),65 or (2) HMOs negligence resting
upon the plan's cost-containment mechanisms (such as utilization re-
view or the use of financial incentives to keep the level of treatment to
a minimum).66
C. The Issue of ERISA Pre-emption Before the Courts
Plaintiffs often bring medical malpractice actions alleging the
HMO's. actions caused injury.67 Court decisions focus on the precise
type of medical malpractice theory to answer the threshold question of
whether ERISA pre-empt s the claims of HMO members.68 In particu-
lar, malpractice claims will center upon the quality of care the HMO
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 514 U.S.
645, 654-57 (1993)).
62. See id. (citing New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656 (1993)). In essence,
"[t]he basic thrust of ... [ERISA's] pre-emption clause . . . was to avoid a
multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform administra-
tion of employee benefit plans." Id at 611 (citation omitted). The ERISA
provision that requires pre-emption of the state law relates to a plan that is not
entirely expansive. Congress did not remove the initial presumption when
analyzing a pre-emption question, namely that state law is traditionally left to
the state's control. See id (citing De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical
Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 813 (1997) (citations omitted).
63. See Fehn, supra note 24, at 518.
64. See Chan, supra note 23, at 205-207. For a detailed discussion of the
theories of direct and vicarious liability for managed care organizations, see
Corrine P. Parver & Kimberly Alyson Martinez, Holding Decision Makers Li-
able: Assessing Liability Under a Managed Care System, 50 ADMIN. L. REV.
199, 207-24 (1999).
65. See Chan, supra note 23, at 205-207.
66. See Chittenden, supra note 25, at 487.
67. See cases discussed infra I. C.
68. See Chan, supra note 23, at 217.
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member received or the benefit denied by the HMO.6 9 If the court de-
termines the claim is based upon the alleged negligence of the HMO
in denying access to benefits, it often will not survive ERISA pre-
emption.70 On the other hand, if it is based upon the alleged negligence
of the HMO with respect to the quality of medical care given to the
HMO member, the claim is more likely to survive.
7'
The actions brought by the Corcorans and Mrs. Dukes with respect
to the alleged malpractice of their respective insurers received very
different treatment by the courts.72 These cases illustrate the distinc-
tion between claims alleging negligence in quality of care and those
alleging negligence in the administration of benefits. 73 Courts ad-
dressing medical malpractice claims based upon the denial of benefits
generally have held such claims to be related to the employee benefit
plan and, therefore, pre-empted by ERISA.74 The Corcoran case is
particularly illustrative of this distinction. 75 This action was brought
by the parents of a deceased unborn child.76 The benefit plan to which
Mrs. Corcoran belonged implemented utilization review, a cost-
containment mechanism, 77 and the party conducting the review found
69. See id.
70. See id; Parver & Martinez, supra note 64, at 227-31 (discussing the
pre-emption of claims based on coverage decisions and those based on the
quality of care rendered).
71. See Chan, supra note 23, at 217; see cases discussed infra I. C.
72. See Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3rd Cir. 1995); Cor-
coran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992); Chan, supra
note 23, at 217-24.
73. See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 350; Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965
F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992); Chan, supra note 23, at 217-24.
74. See Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1321; Lancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health
Plan of Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D. Va. 1997); Rodri-
guez v. Pacificare of Texas, Inc., 980 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1993); Andrews-
Clarke v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mass. 1997).
75. See Chan, supra note 23, at 217 (also noting that Corcoran is the
leading case in this genre of cases).
76. See Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1324.
77. Utilization review consists of "external evaluations that are based on
established clinical criteria and are conducted by third party payors, purchas-
ers, or health care organizers to evaluate the appropriateness of an episode, or
series of episodes, of medical care." Id. at 1323 (quoting Blum, An Analysis of
Legal Liability in Health Care Utilization Review and Case Management, 26
Hous. L. REv. 191, 192-93 (1989)).
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that hospitalization was not medically necessary."8 The pregnant Mrs.
Corcoran returned home and days later, she and her husband lost their
child.7 9
The Corcorans filed suit against Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ala-
bama, which administered Mrs. Corcoran's benefit plan, and United
Healthcare, the utilization review entity.80 The district court granted
the defendants' motions for summary judgment, holding ERISA pre-
empted the Corcorans' state law claims which related to the employee
benefit plan at issue.8 1
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit was presented with the issue of
whether the plaintiffs could obtain relief under either state law or
ERISA. 2 The Court of Appeals focused upon both Congress' intent in
enacting ERISA and the express language of the statute." United
Healthcare argued for ERISA pre-emption because the utilization re-
view was simply a determination regarding benefits due under the
plan.8 The Corcorans argued that United Healthcare made an im-
proper medical decision rather than an administrative benefits deter-
mination.85 The court assessed both parties' arguments and concluded
that "United makes medical decisions - indeed, United gives medical
advice - but it does so in the context of making a determination about
the availability of benefits under the plan."86 Accordingly, the court
held that ERISA pre-empted the state action brought by the
Corcorans.
8 7
In reaching its holding, however, the court noted that the utilization
review process, as described in the benefit plan booklet, lends some
support to the claim that United Healthcare does make medical deci-
78. See Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1324.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 1325.
82. See id. at 1326. On appeal, the plaintiffs only challenged the district
court's findings with respect to United Healthcare; the claims against United
Healthcare alleged that the HMO wrongfully denied medical care recom-
mended by their physician and wrongfully found that home care presented suf-
ficient treatment. See id.
83. See Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1328-29.
84. See id. at 1329.
85. See id. at 1330.
86. See id. at 1331.
87. See id.
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sions.88 The court recognized the possibility that United Healthcare by
its actions did in fact make medical judgments.8 9 It noted the system of
prospective decision-making, in which the beneficiary is likely to ref-
use treatment based upon the insurer's refusal to pay for the treatment,
is very different from the traditional retrospective review process. 90
The court declared that when United Healthcare performed its utiliza-
tion review, it made a medical recommendation. 9' Nonetheless, al-
though it recognized that the process implemented by United
Healthcare involved medical decisions, the court was not willing to
acknowledge that United did not make any benefits determinations.
92
Although United Healthcare made medical judgments, the Corcoran
court declared that it did so in the process of deciding what benefits
were available to the members under that particular plan.93 Further-
more, the court recognized the potential implications if it were to hold
United subject to state liability laws. 94 The court noted that forcing in-
surers to comply with different state utilization review standards
would drive up the costs associated with such reviews, thus decreasing
the funds available to plan participants. 95 Finally, the court acknowl-
edged that the fact there is no remedy available cannot affect its inter-
pretation of ERISA.96
Other courts have followed the distinction drawn between the ad-
ministration of benefits, the rendering of medical decisions, and qual-
ity of care. 97 In Lancaster v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Mid-
Atlantic States, Inc.,98 the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia faced the issue of whether medical malpractice
claims stemming from an HMO's use of financial incentives99 for phy-
88. See id.
89. See Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1331.
90. See id. at 1331-32.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 1332.
93. See id.
94. See Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1333.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See Lancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic States,
Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D. Va. 1997); Rodriguez v. Pacificare of Texas,
Inc., 980 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1993); Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers' Ins. Co.,
984 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mass. 1997).
98. 958 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D. Va. 1997).
99. In this case, financial incentive programs involved programs where the
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sicians were pre-empted by ERISA. 00 The minor plaintiff, who suf-
fered from recurring headaches, was placed on pain medication.' 0' The
doctors, who were employees of the corporation that was contracted
by Kaiser, failed to order any diagnostic tests, such as a magnetic
resonance image (MRI).10 2 Four years later, an MRI revealed a tumor
had invaded over forty percent of Paige Lancaster's brain. 3 Among
other counts and allegations, 10 4 Paige's mother, individually and on
behalf of her daughter, alleged Kaiser was negligent in its implemen-
tation of the financial incentive program.' 05
The Lancaster court, in addressing whether ERISA pre-empted con-
sideration of the incentive program, noted that the financial incentive
program was very similar to pre-certification and utilization review
requirements.'0 6 It found the financial incentive program affected the
quantity of benefits given to a beneficiary. 10 7 Accordingly, the court
held that ERISA pre-empted the claims against Kaiser stemming from
the incentive program.
0 8
Regarding the pre-emption of claims involving the quantity or ad-
ministration of benefits to a beneficiary, the Fifth Circuit, in Rodri-
guez v. Pacificare of Texas, Inc.,109 addressed the claims of a plan
member when his HMO denied a referral"0° to an orthopedic
physicians allegedly received bonus money if they did not utilize excessive
treatments and tests. See Lancaster, 958 F. Supp. at 1140.
100. See id. at 1140-41.
101. See id at 1139-40.
102. See id. at 1139-40.
103. See id. at 1140.
104. Plaintiffs' complaint contained five counts: Counts I and II alleged
that the doctors deviated from the accepted standard of care and did not act as
reasonably prudent physicians. Counts III and IV alleged that Kaiser and the
physicians' corporation were liable under a theory of vicarious liability and di-
rect liability for the financial incentive policies. Count V alleged that each de-
fendant made material misrepresentations to the plaintiff when, while they
were using this incentive program, the doctors represented to the plaintiff that
she was receiving quality care. See id at 1141.
105. See Lancaster, 958 F. Supp. at 1146.
106. See id. at 1147.
107. See id. The Court also noted that such program could affect the qual-
ity of benefits. See id
108. See id. at 1148.
109. 980 F.2d 1014.
110. Pacificare, the HMO, required referral letters before reimbursing pa-
Texas Health Care Liability Act
specialist."' The plaintiff alleged the HMO did not provide prompt
and adequate care and coverage. 1 2 In assessing his claims, the court
noted that ERISA pre-empted the state law claims against the HMO
because they were largely connected to the plaintiffs problem in han-
dling medical claims and were thus related to an employee benefit
plan."
3
The United States District Court for Massachusetts also scrutinized
the utilization review processes in Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers' Ins.
Co. 1 4 In this case, a Travelers' insurance policy beneficiary was de-
nied coverage for a thirty-day inpatient alcohol rehabilitation
program."1, The beneficiary, after a series of drinking binges and sui-
cide attempts, eventually killed himself. 16 Although the court noted
that the decedent died as a result of the failure to pre-approve the
needed treatment, it still held that ERISA pre-empted the state law
claims because they stemmed from the alleged improper processing of
the claims for benefits. 1 7 The court recognized, however, that Con-
gress should amend ERISA and consider the recent changes in health
care.
118
When the issue centers upon the quality of medical care that the en-
rollee receives, courts have reached a different result from the cases
involving the quantity of benefits. 19 The decision rendered by the
Third Circuit in Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc.' 20 is particularly in-
dicative of how some courts deal with ERISA pre-emption regarding
the quality of medical care.' 21 In Dukes, the court examined ERISA
pre-emption when it consolidated two cases involving medical treat-
ment resulting in the deaths of beneficiaries.' 2  A primary care physi-
tients for treatment from a specialist. See id. at 1016.
111. See id
112. See id.
113. See id. at 1017.
114. 984 F. Supp. 49.
115. See id. at 51-53.
116. See id
117. See id. at 52, 54.
118. See id at 53.
119. See Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3rd Cir. 1995);
Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995); Bau-
man v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 1 F. Supp. 2d 420 (D. N.J. 1998).
120. 57 F.3d 350 (3rd Cir. 1995).
121. See Chan, supra note 23, at 221.
122. See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 352-53.
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cian ordered blood studies for Darryl Dukes, 123 but when he presented
the prescription to a hospital, the hospital refused to perform such
tests.124 After another doctor subsequently ordered the tests, the hos-
pital finally performed them, but not before Dukes' condition had al-
ready worsened. 25 He eventually died and final tests indicated an ab-
normal blood sugar level. 126 Dukes' wife sued the HMO under the
theories of agency and direct negligence of the HMO by failing to
monitor medical personnel. 27 The other claim addressed by the Dukes
court involved a stillborn child. 128 Linda Visconti's obstetrician alleg-
edly failed to recognize typical symptoms of pre-eclampsia during her
pregnancy. 29 The Viscontis received HMO-provided health care and
sued the HMO, based on theories similar to Mrs. Dukes'. 30
Both claims alleged the quality of care and benefits were
improper.' 3' The plaintiffs did not complain about the HMO's failure
to provide certain benefits under the plans 32 but rather, "complain[ed]
about the low quality of the medical treatment that they actually re-
ceived and argued that the U.S. Healthcare HMO should be liable un-
der agency and negligence principles."' 133 The court noted Congress'
concern in enacting ERISA was essentially the administration and
payment of benefits. 34 The legislative history of ERISA does not indi-
cate Congress' intent to assure quality of care.1 35 Accordingly, the
court held ERISA did not pre-empt such claims.' 36 However, the court
recognized that the distinction between the quality and quantity of
care will not always be clear, particularly in cases involving health
services.'
137





128. See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 353.
129. See id.
130. See id
131. See id. at 355.
132. See id. at 356-57.
133. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 357.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 356.
137. See id. at 358.
Texas Health Care Liability Act
The Dukes court distinguished Corcoran,'38 noting that the HMO in
Corcoran did not provide for, supervise, or monitor the physicians,
and was only responsible for the utilization review, an administrative
function.'39 By contrast, the HMO in Dukes was responsible for ar-
ranging and providing medical treatment.' 40 The plaintiffs in Dukes
did not allege they were denied benefits, and only sought to hold the
HMO liable as the arranger and provider of the treatment, thus af-
fording a remedy for the wrong.'
4 1
II. TEXAS LISTENS TO THE CONCERNS OF ITS HEALTH CARE
CONSUMERS
A. The Texas-Health Care Liability Act
In May 1997, Texas became the first state to allow patients to sue
their HMOs for medical malpractice. 142 Members of the Senate In-
terim Committee on Managed Care and Consumer Protections intro-
duced Texas Senate Bill 386 on January 30, 1997.14 The legislation
was part of a package of six bills 144 generated by the Committee's rec-
138. See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 359-361.
139. See id at 360-61.
140. See id. at 356-61.
141. See id. at 361.
142. See Sarah Lunday, Suicide Victim's Family Sues HMO Under New
Texas Law, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Oct. 20, 1998, at 1; see Stoeckl, su-
pra note 30, at 399 (stating that Texas became the first state to change the pro-
tection that HMOs had previously enjoyed). Efforts to enact and pass the leg-
islation were successful because of a number of publicized managed care scan-
dals that occurred in Texas. See Bob Carlson, Managed Care Reform: How
Texas Pulled Off What Washington Can't, MANAGED CARE, Feb. 1999, at 23.
A similar version of the Act entitled the Texas Medical Association's Patient
Protection Act was vetoed by Governor George W. Bush in 1995. See id.
143. See Texas:. HMOs Would be Liable for Negligent Decisions Under
Proposed Legislation, 6 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 6, at d26 (Feb. 6, 1997).
144. Although the five other bills are not pertinent to this Note, they in-
cluded the removal of "gag clauses" which prohibit a doctor from informing
his or her patient of the following: all treatment options, the implementation of
a standardized utilization review procedure, the prohibition of retaliation
against preferred provider organizations; an increase in the surplus requirement
for HMO basic service, and the use of a rating system by consumers in order to
compare health plans. See id.
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ommendations in a December 1996 report.145 The purpose of the bills,
according to Texas Senator David Sibley, was to provide protection
for health care consumers in an ever-expanding health care industry
and to hold managed care organizations liable for their medical mis-
takes, just as physicians are accountable for their negligence.146 The
Texas legislature's effort stemmed from the public's worry that with
the growth of the managed care industry, insurers rather than doctors
were becoming more active in the medical decision-making process.1
47
The public was concerned it would have no remedy against the insur-
ers if such decisions did in fact cause injury to the patient.
48
The bill seeking to hold HMOs liable for medical malpractice was
met with both a sense of welcome and a sense of skepticism.149 On the
one hand, employer groups and HMOs opposed the bill, citing con-
cerns that the legislation would result in a large increase in health care
costs. 5 Kelli Brady, the regional public relations manager for Aetna
145. See id. (recommending that managed care organizations be held ac-
countable for the decisions they make where such decisions cause the patient to
become injured); Impact of Texas, Missouri Laws in Health Plan Liability Un-
certain, 7 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 41 (Jan. 1, 1998). The committee issued the
report after holding public hearings throughout the state of Texas. See David
Coleman, Health Plan Liability, HEALTHPLAN, Mar./Apr. 1997, at 77, 81.
Texan health care consumers, such as Elizabeth Hilsabeck, whose HMO denied
payment for physical therapy for her infant son after six months, actively lob-
bied the Texas legislature to pass legislation preventing managed care organi-
zations from using ERISA as a means of protection. See Karen Foerstel,
Texas' HMO Liability Law: The Jury is Still Out, 57 CONG. Q. 381, 382
(1999).
146. See Texas: HMOs Would be Liable for Negligent Decisions Under
Proposed Legislation, 6 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 6, at d26 (Feb. 6, 1997).
Senator Sibley's concern focused on situations in which an HMO refuses to
pay for a treatment that was recommended by the physician. See Coleman, su-
pra note 145, at 8 1.
147. See Impact of Texas, Missouri Laws in Health Plan Liability Uncer-
tain, 6 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 14, at d3 (Jan. 1, 1998).
148. See id.
149. See Texas: HMOs Would be Liable for Negligent Decisions Under
Proposed Legislation, 6 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 6, at d26 (Feb. 6, 1997) (de-
scribing the various reactions to the legislation); Stoeckl, supra note 30, at 401.
150. See Stoeckl, supra note 30, at 401. The executive director of the em-
ployer-lead coalition, Texans for Quality Health Care, stated that the members
of this group "have already experienced 'a decade of double-digit inflation in
health care costs and defensive medicine and are scared they'll be forced back
Texas Health Care Liability Act
Health Plans of Texas, predicted "litigation stemming from the new
law could drive up costs by $550 million to $1 billion a year.'
51
On the other hand, the legislation received a great deal of support
from the Texas Medical Association (TMA)."' TMA lent its full sup-
port to the bill, citing its belief that medical decisions should be left to
physicians rather than HMO employees concerned largely with maxi-
mizing profit. 5 3 Despite the conflicting viewpoints, Senate Bill 386
passed in May 1997 and the Texas Health Care Liability Act went into
effect on September 1, 1997.'5 The Act is expected to serve as an ex-
ample and model for other states, thirty of which have considered
similar liability legislation.
5 5
The Act arms patients with the ability to sue their HMOs for
breaches156 of two duties imposed upon managed care organizations.'i 7
First, the Act provides that the managed care entity has a duty to exer-
cise ordinary care when it makes a health treatment decision; the en-
tity may be liable for any damages resulting from the failure to exer-
cise this ordinary care.SS The Act defines a "health care treatment de-
into it by the year 2000."' Texas: HMO Would Be Liable for Negligent Deci-
sions Under Proposed Legislation, 6 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 6, at d26 (Feb. 6,
1997).
151. Texas: Aetna Files Suits Against State to Block New HMO Liability, 6
HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 26, at d20 (June 26, 1997). Two other opponents to
the legislation, Texas HMO Association and Texans for Quality Health Care,
also contended that the measure would lead to the increased filing of frivolous
lawsuits and would increase HMO costs by five percent.. See Ken Ortolon,
Coming In First, TEXAS MEDICINE, Sept. 1997, at 26, 27.
152. See Texas, supra note 150, at d26; See Stoeckl, supra note 30, at 401.
153. See Texas, supra note 150, at d26. Specifically, Hugh Lamensdorf,
the president of the Texas Medical Association, stated that "[d]ecisions must be
made by the physician who is involved with the patient as a person and not by
the accountant whose job it is to maximize profit." Id.
154. See Stoeckl, supra note 30, at 401-402. The bill became law in Texas
without the signature of Governor George W. Bush. See id.
155. See Did Court in Texas Split the Baby in HMO Liability Decision?, 7
HEALTH L. REP. 1694 (Oct. 22, 1998).
156. See Stoeckl, supra note 30, at 402; Impact of Texas, Missouri Laws on
Health Plan Liability Uncertain, 7 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 41 (Jan. 1, 1998).
157. See Stoeckl, supra note 30, at 402; Impact of Texas, Missouri Laws
on Health Plan Liability Uncertain, 7 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 41 (Jan. 1,
1998).
158. TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002(a) (West 1999); see
also Stoeckl, supra note 30, at 402; Impact of Texas, Missouri Laws on Health
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cision" as "a determination made when medical services are actually
provided by the health plan and a decision which affects the quality of
the diagnosis, care, or treatment provided to the plan's insureds or en-
rollees."' 9 It holds HMOs liable for their decisions regarding treat-
ments covered by the plan160 and also establishes a standard of care
applicable to HMOs in making coverage decisions.'
6'
Second, the Act holds the managed care entity liable for damages
incurred by a patient as a result of health care treatment decisions
made by employees, agents, ostensible agents or representatives on its
behalf. 62 This liability extends not only to medical care rendered by
the employees or agents, but also to medical coverage decisions made
by such persons.' 63 One commentator suggests this second cause of
action is particularly applicable to holding a physician and managed
care entity liable for damages caused by the implementation of a utili-
zation review process or a pre-certification requirement.
64
B. The Texas Health Care Liability Act Is Challenged
Due to the Act's potential negative effects on the managed care in-
dustry, Aetna Health Plans of Texas filed suit against the State of
Texas on June 16, 1997, in an effort to block the law. 65 The plaintiffs
sought declaratory relief arguing ERISA pre-empted the Texas Health
Care Liability Act, and injunctive relief by seeking to enjoin the en-
forcement of the Texas legislation as it relates to plans covered by
ERISA. 166 The plaintiffs alleged that:
Plan Liability Uncertain, 7 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 41 (Jan. 1, 1998).
159. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.001(5) (West 1999).
160. See Stoeckl, supra note 30, at 403; Impact of Texas, Missouri Laws on
Health Plan Liability Uncertain, 7 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 41 (Jan. 1, 1998).
161. See Stoeckl, supra note 30, at 403; Impact of Texas, Missouri Laws
on Health Plan Liability Uncertain, 7 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 41 (Jan. 1,
1998).
162. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002(b) (West 1999).
163. See Impact of Texas, Missouri Laws on Health Plan Liability Uncer-
tain, 7 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 41 (Jan. 1, 1998).
164. See Stoeckl, supra note 30, at 403.
165. See Corp. Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Ins., 12 F. Supp. 597
(S.D. Tex. 1998); see also Texas: Aetna Files Suit Against State to Block New
HMO Liability Law, 6 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 26, at d20 (June 26, 1997).
166. See Corp. Health, 12 F. Supp. at 602; Texas: Aetna Files Suit Against
State to Block New HMO Liability Law, 6 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 26, at d20
Texas Health Care Liability Act
[t]he Legislature has sought ... to change the terms of
employee benefit plans and restrict the ability of plans
to deny claims based upon medical necessity as defined
by the terms of the employee benefit plans ... This at-
tempt to mandate or alter benefits available under
ERISA employee benefit plans improperly interferes
with the administration of those plans when medical
necessity determinations are made, and is fundamen-
tally at odds with Congressional intent to minimize the
need for employers to administer their plans differently
in each state where they have employees.
67
The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment contending the Act seeks
to impose liability on ERISA entities and attempts to interfere with an
area reserved for Congress.
168
In response to the plaintiffs' motion, the State of Texas 169 filed a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim."o Defendants argued that
dismissal was appropriate because the Act does not try to regulate or
control the administration of benefits, but rather, attempts to regulate
the quality of care and medical treatment rendered by an HMO in
Texas. 71 The defendants requested that in the alternative, if the court
found ERISA pre-empted any portion of the Act, these portions should
simply be severed.
7 2
The court began its analysis by examining what constitutes an
ERISA plan and whether the Act relates to an employee benefit
plan. 73 The court found the plaintiffs and the services they provided
were not ERISA plans because the coverage was not maintained by an
employer. 74 The plaintiffs argued that even though Aetna was not an
(June 26, 1997).
167. Texas: Aetna Files Suit Against State to Block New HMO Liability
Law, 6 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 26, at d20 (June 26, 1997).
168. See Corp. Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 603.
169. The defendants were the Texas Department of Insurance, the Com-
missioner of the Texas Department of Insurance and the Attorney General of
the State of Texas. See id. at 602.
170. See id. at 603. The motion to dismiss was eventually converted by the
court into a motion for summary judgment. See id.
171. See id. at 603. The defendants also alleged that the Department of In-
surance and its Commissioner were not proper parties to this action. See id.
172. See Corp. Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 603.
173. See id. at 608.
174. See id. at 609.
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ERISA plan, this was irrelevant to the ERISA pre-emption analysis.
7 5
Since the court found that certain severable portions of the Act did
relate to ERISA employee benefit plans, it concluded that whether
plaintiffs in this matter were ERISA plans is irrelevant.t
76
The court next analyzed whether the Act was related to an ERISA
plan. 177 This analysis examined Congress' objectives and intentions in
enacting the ERISA pre-emption provisions. 178 The court noted Con-
gress' intention to create a uniform set of regulations to prevent ad-
ministrative burdens on entities complying with state regulations.
79
The court also noted that the Act imposed "a standard of ordinary care
directly upon health insurance carriers and health maintenance organi-
zations when making health care treatment decisions, regardless of
whether the commercial coverage or membership therein is ultimately
secured by an ERISA plan.' 80 The Act expressly excluded from ap-
plicability employers purchasing coverage for their employees and, as
such, does not make any reference to ERISA plans.' 8' Plaintiffs argued
that, because the Act used certain terms, such as "health care plan"
and "health maintenance organization" that refer to ERISA plans,
there should be ERISA pre-emption. 182 The court rejected this argu-
ment, finding that although there was reference to such plans, the ex-
istence of these ERISA plans was not essential to the Act and it was
not based on the existence of these plans.'8 3 Furthermore, the entities
listed in the Act are not ERISA plans and thus, the court reasoned the
Act cannot be said to make reference to ERISA plans.
8 4
As long as a state law has a connection with ERISA plans, ERISA
may still pre-empt that law even if it does not make a specific refer-
175. See id. at 610.
176. See id.
177. See Corporate Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 610-11.
178. See id. at 611.
179. See id (quoting New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656 (1995) (quoting Inger-
soll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990)).
180. Corp. Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 612.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See id. at 613.
184. See id. at 614 (quoting New York State Conference of Blue Cross &
Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656 (1995)).
Texas Health Care Liability Act
ence to ERISA.18 5 Consequently, the court examined whether the Act
had a connection with ERISA plans . 6 Here, the plaintiffs argued that,
among other ways, 8 7 the Act was connected with ERISA plans be-
cause it imposed state liability on ERISA plans. I88 To support their
theory, the plaintiffs cited the Fifth Circuit's holdings in Corcoran v.
HealthCare and Rodriguez v. Pacificare of Texas.189 After examining
the facts and holding in Corcoran, the court concluded it was clearly
distinguishable from the case at hand.190 It noted that while the Cor-
coran plaintiffs filed suit based upon the denial of certain plan bene-
fits, a suit brought under the Act would relate to the quality of benefits
when distributed rather than when the benefits are denied. 191 The ex-
press language of the Act reiterates this when it defines a "health care
treatment decision" as occurring when medical services are actually
provided and the decision affects the quality of the treatment.'9 2 In re-
sponse to the plaintiffs' contention that the Fifth Circuit's holding in
Rodriguez mandates pre-emption, the court once again looked at the
particular facts and holding in Rodriguez. 93 The Court noted that Rod-
riguez's claims against the HMO stemmed from his dissatisfaction
with the way his claim was handled, and for this reason, the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that the claims were related to the plan. 194 However, a claim
brought under the Act may "challenge the quality of benefits actually
received without challenging a denial of benefits or the handling of a
medical claim."'195
The court in Corporate Health Insurance found the case of Dukes
185. See Corp. Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 614 (quoting California Div. of
Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. 316, 325
(1997)).
186. See id.
187. See id The plaintiffs also argued that the Act was connected with
ERISA plans because it "impermissibly mandates the structure of plan benefits
and their administration, unlawfully binds plan administrators to particular
choices, and wrongfully creates an alternate enforcement mechanism." Id.
188. See id.
189. See Corporate Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 614.
190. See id at 617.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 617-18.
194. See Corp. Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 618.
195. Id.
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v. US. Healthcare196 to be more relevant, because it addressed the
quality of care actually rendered and received by the patient. 197 The
court focused on the distinction in Dukes between the denial of bene-
fits and the quality of benefits actually rendered.19 8 In Dukes the court
noted that the plaintiffs alleged negligence was based upon the poor
quality of medical treatment rather than the withholding of benefits. 199
Under the Act, a claim which contests the quality of the benefits re-
ceived, rather than the benefit determination itself, is valid. 200 Fur-
thermore, the court focused upon the dual role an HMO plays as either
the coordinator of health benefits or simply as a utilization reviewer.20,
Accordingly, a person suing under the Act may seek to hold the HMO
liable as the coordinator of poor quality treatment rather than for its
role in denying benefits.20 2 The court did acknowledge the distinction
between quality of care and the denial of benefits is not always
clear.
203
The court ultimately concluded the Act specifically relates to the
quality of benefits, an issue not addressed in any manner in ERISA.0 4
Therefore, the Act did not "constitute an improper imposition of state
law liability on the enumerated entities."
20 5
C. The First Claim under the Texas Health Care Liability Act
On October 19, 1998, the family of a Fort Worth man became the
first plaintiffs to seek a remedy under the Act when it filed suit against
NYLCare of Texas alleging the HMO contributed to the man's
death.20 6 The plaintiffs alleged HMO representatives required All
196. 57 F.3d 350.
197. See Corp. Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 618-19.
198. See id at 619.
199. See id. at 619 (quoting Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350,
357 (3rd Cir. 1995)).
200. See id
20 1. See id
202. See Corp. Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 619.
203. See id. at 619 n. 12.
204. See id at 620.
205. Corp. Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 620.
206. See Texas: Family of Fort Worth Suicide First to Test HMO Liability
Law, 7 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 1721 (Oct. 29, 1998). Although the suit was
filed in a state court of Texas, the defendant, NYLCare moved the case to fed-
eral court where the amount of damages are more limited. See Foerstel, supra
Texas Health Care Liability Act
Saints Hospital to discharge Joseph Plocica, who had a very long his-
tory of depression and repeated suicide attempts, from the psychiatric
ward.207 Dr. Harold Eudaly, Jr., Mr. Plocica's physician, opposed the
discharge and recommended that he remain hospitalized until "his
condition stabilized, his medications were adjusted, and he no longer
expressed suicidal thoughts." 208 Despite this recommendation, Dr.
Gary K. Neller, who was employed by Merit Behavioral Care Systems
Corporation, which managed the mental health cases involving NYL-
Care members on a capitated basis, ordered Mr. Plocica's discharge
from the hospital. 20 9 The following evening, Mr. Plocica drank a half-
gallon of antifreeze. 210 He died nine days later after being removed
from life support systems because his doctors determined that he
would never regain brain or bodily functions.
21'
Mr. Plocica's wife and four children filed a suit in Tarrant County,
Texas,212 alleging NYLCare failed to provide adequate quality of
care.213 They argued the cost-containment mechanisms used by NYL-
Care, together with the failure to implement quality control policies
and Dr. Neller's negligence, caused Mr. Plocica's death.214 The com-
plaint stated "Joe Plocica had 'used up his days' according to what-
ever 'cookbooks' or protocols for psychiatric treatment that NYLCare
note 145, at 382. The Plocica's attorney has made attempts to move the case
back to state court. See id
207. See Texas: Family of Fort Worth Suicide First to Test HMO Liability
Law, 7 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 1721 (Oct. 29, 1998).
208. Id.
209. See id.
210. See Texas: Family of Fort Worth Suicide First to Test HMO Liability
Law, 7 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 1721 (Oct. 29, 1998); David Koenig, Family
Sues Over Man's Suicide-Attorney Says Companies Decide About Payments,
Not About When to Release Patients, AUSTIN-AMERICAN STATESMAN, Oct. 21,
1998, at BI; Lunday, supra note 142, at 1.
211. See Texas: Family of Fort Worth Suicide First to Test HMO Liability
Law, 7 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 1721 (Oct. 29, 1998); David Koenig, Family
Sues Over Man's Suicide-Attorney Says Companies Decide About Payments,
Not About When to Release Patients, AUSTIN-AMERICAN STATESMAN, Oct. 21,
1998, at BI; Lunday, supra note 142, at 1.
212. See Lunday, supra note 142, at 1.
213. See Texas: Family of Fort Worth Suicide First to Test HMO Liability
Law, 7 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 1721 (Oct. 29, 1998).
214. See id.
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and Merit were using at the time.', 21 ' Although he declined to discuss
this particular suit, NYLCare's attorney, Bill Blunt, stated that an
HMO does not decide whether to discharge a patient, but rather
merely decides the question of payment for the hospital stay.216 Be-
cause the suit brought by the Plocica family could set the stage for
future cases against HMOs, the family's lawyers were especially care-
ful in selecting which case would be the first brought under the Act.
217
III. ANALYSIS: How MUCH HAS TEXAS HEARD?
Texas responded to its health care consumers' concerns about pro-
tection against the increasing role of managed care entities and the
treatment decisions they make.2 8 Yet, whether these consumers are
really protected as a result of the Act remains in question.1 9 This
question is of particular importance in light of the Texas court's ruling
on the right to sue, and whether that ruling increases the likelihood of
other state legislatures introducing similar measures.
220
One commentator has suggested that, despite the Act's movement
towards managed care liability, the state law will not afford sufficient
protection because managed care entities will continue to find a de-
fense in ERISA.22' One solution to this problem would be to call upon
215. See id.
216. See Koenig, supra note 211, at BI. NYLCare has denied the allega-
tions set forth by the Plocica family and has stated that such claims are barred
as a result of the plaintiffs' own negligence. See Foerstel, supra note 145, at
382.
217. See Lunday, supra note 142, at 1. George Young, the attorney for the
Plocica family, stated that because the first lawsuit filed under the Act would
set precedent, he carefully selected the first case to file and turned away ten
other clients before selecting the Plocica suit as the first to file. See Foerstel,
supra note 145, at 382.
218. See Impact of Texas, Missouri Laws on Health Plan Liability Uncer-
tain, 7 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 41 (Jan. 1, 1998).
219. See Stoeckl, supra note 30, at 409 (questioning how much the Act has
truly provided). While very few lawsuits have been filed, the legislation has
created a sense of distrust of the physician by the patient and increased insur-
ance premiums possibly related to the Act. See Foerstel, supra note 145, at
382.
220. See Texas: Court Upholds Patient Right to Sue HMOs; Strikes Down
Other Portions of Texas Statute, 7 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 1483 (Sept. 24,
1998).
221. See Stoeckl, supra note 30, at 409. When plaintiffs attempt to sue
Texas Health Care Liability Act
Congress to amend ERISA so that HMOs will no longer be able to
hide behind this shield of immunity. 222 It may be necessary for Con-
gress to change the remedies available under ERISA or define how
processes such as utilization review figure into ERISA so that consis-
tent pre-emption decisions are made by courts throughout the United
their HMOs, it presents an uphill battle and the effect of the Act is uncertain.
See Douglas H. Ustick, Texas: The New Accountability, HEALTH SYSTEMS
REVIEW, Nov./Dec. 1997, at 30, 31.
222. See Stoeckl, supra note 30, at 409; Parver & Martinez, supra note 64,
at 235-236 (suggesting reforming ERISA so as to expand patients' rights
against HMOs).
The House of Representatives passed a bill on October 7, 1999, which
would allow patients to sue federally regulated health plans in either state court
or federal court for unlimited damages. See Amy Goldstein & Juliet Eilperin,
House Votes to Increase Rights of HMO Patients, WASH. POST, October 8,
1999, at Al. The version of the bill passed by the Senate in July 1999 did not
include a provision that would allow a patient to sue his or her federally regu-
lated health plan. See id. Be~ause the two bills are very different, many have
predicted that the House bill will not be entirely successful. See id. During the
preparation for the House vote, many partisans gave discouraging predictions
of what the result may be if Americans were able to sue their health plans but
the Texas law which allows Texans to file such suits has seen a mild effect
with only five of which had been filed by September 1999. See Amy Gold-
stein, 'Patients' Rights' Case Study: So Far, Benign, WASH. POST, Sept. 28,
1999, at Al.
The process of negotiation of the bills will likely be even more difficult in
light of the fact that Republican leaders in the House, who had strongly op-
posed the House bill, named to the committee which will negotiate with the
Senate were not supporters of the bill. See David E Rosenbaum, Not Quite
Business As Usual in House on Managed Care, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1999, at
Al. In fact, of the twelve Republican conferees named by House Speaker J.
Dennis Hastert, ten had voted against the bill while one had supported it and
the other had been absent. See id. Two leading Republican supporters, Repre-
sentative Charles Norwood of Georgia and Representative Greg Ganske of
Iowa were both denied seats at the conference committee. See id The eight
Democratic House conferees had voted for the bill. See id. Seven Republican
senators who voted for the weaker Senate bill and five Democratic senators
who support the House version make up the Senate conferees. See id. In order
for the bill to be approved by the conference committee, a majority of the Sen-
ate conferees and House conferees voting separately must be in favor. See id.
The actions by the Republican leaders in naming the conferees was seen by
others as a way to weaken the House bill. See Juliet Eilperin, Speaker Ex-
cludes 2 From Talks, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1999, at A 10.
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States. 23
Although the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Texas upheld the right to sue managed care entities under the Act,
health care consumers of Texas still have not been afforded the pro-
tection they deserve and desire.224 The court's decision, in effect, was
simply an extension of the Dukes holding and not really a new source
of protection for American health care consumers. 225 In holding that a
suit may be brought under the Act if it challenges the quality of bene-
fits received rather than a benefit determination itself, the court fo-
cused primarily on Dukes' distinction between quality of care and
benefit determinations. 226 The court allows for managed care entities
to be held liable under the Act for the quality of benefits that it renders
to its members.227 The court in Corporate Health Insurance noted the
potential problems that may develop in attempting to distinguish be-
tween claims centering on the quantity of benefits under the plan and
the quality of benefits rendered.228 Since the holding is actually very
limited, this distinction could weaken the Act's effectiveness in pro-
viding a remedy for Texas health care consumers.229 In particular, one
commentator noted that utilization review, the most criticized man-
aged care abuse, still remains unrestricted and ERISA still pre-empt s
223. See Stoeckl, supra note 30, at 409.
224. See id. (noting that the managed care entities are still protected by
ERISA); Chan, supra note 23, at 223 (describing the false distinction between
quality and quantity of benefits). It has been stated that the Court's reasoning
in the Corporate Health case is flawed because there is no distinction between
quality and quantity of benefits and the Court's decision actually narrowed the
scope of the Act. See Jordan, supra note 30, at 17-18.
225. See Chan, supra note 23, at 223-24 (describing the slippery slope that
develops when a plaintiff attempts to recover for poor quality of treatment and
noting the unclear distinction between the quality of care and the denial of
benefits as recognized by the Dukes court); Jordan, supra note 30, at 17-18.
226. See Brenda T. Strama, Did Court in Texas Split the Baby in HMO Li-
ability Decision?, 7 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 1694 (Oct. 22, 1998).
227. See Corp. Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 619-620.
228. See id. at 619 n. 12; see also Strama, supra note 226, at 1694. The
Court noted that whether the claim related to the quality or quantity of benefits,
which affects whether the claim will be pre-empted by ERISA, must be case-
by-case specific. See id.
229. See Strama, supra note 226, at 1694; Chan, supra note 23, at 223 (de-
scribing the false distinction between quality and quantity of benefits).
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claims challenging utilization review.
230
In addition to recognizing the difficulty in distinguishing between
the quality and quantity of benefits,2 3' the court also recognized that it
will be difficult for a plaintiff to bring such actions and obtain an ade-
quate remedy under the Act.232 This contention, coupled with the
court's suggestion that the Act addresses the quality of benefits, not
the quantity, make the remedy available under the Act very narrow in
scope.233 As many commentators have suggested, because the quality
and quantity decisions are intertwined, many claims of poor quality of
treatment will also involve quantity of benefits issues, thus calling for
pre-emption.234 Accordingly, there exists a slippery slope when distin-
guishing between claims based on quality of care and the quantity of
benefits due.235 Even when a plaintiff is successful in characterizing
his or her claim as that which deals with the quality of care, the man-
aged care entity could win pre-emption by arguing that the quality of
care was so low that it constituted a denial of benefits.
236
The medical care a patient receives, and the quality of that care, will
depend in part on an HMO's decision regarding benefits afforded to
that patient.237 Although the managed care entity is simply deciding
whether to permit and pay for the benefit, the treatment the patient re-
ceives will be greatly affected by this decision primarily because a pa-
tient will usually refuse treatment that he or she must pay for out of
pocket. 238 Accordingly, plaintiffs injured due to a denial of benefits
230. See Strama, supra note 226, at 1694.
231. See Corp. Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 619 n.12.
232. See id.
233. See Chan, supra note 23, at 223 (describing the false distinction be-
tween quality and quantity of benefits); Strama, supra note 226, at 1694 (not-
ing that the Court's holding is limited).
234. See Chan, supra note 23, at 215-24 (stating that the distinction be-
tween claims for denial of benefits and claims challenging the quality of care is
a false distinction); Stoeckl, supra note 30, at 390 (medical treatment received
by a patient depends both on the decisions made by the physician and those of
the HMO regarding the type and amount of care to be given); Easley, supra
note 36, at 314-16; Chittenden, supra note 25, at 489 (the distinction between
claims on the administration of a benefit plan and those based on the quality of
care is artificial).
235. See Chan, supra note 23, at 223.
236. See id
237. See Stoeckl, supra note 30, at 390.
238. See id. at 403; Chan, supra note 23, at 221.
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will not be permitted to pursue their claim under the Act, thus contrib-
uting to the Act's inability to protect Texas health care consumers.
239
Patients injured because the quantity of benefits determination af-
fected the quality of care they received may be unable to bring suit
against the HMO under the Act.
240
In accordance with the recent decision in the Southern District
Court of Texas, and in light of the ambiguous distinction between
quality and quantity of care claims, it is likely that the case brought by
the Plocica family will fail. 241' Although the complaint alleges poor
quality of medical treatment, it can be argued that what is apparently
at issue is the managed care entity's decision that the benefit of a
longer hospital stay was unavailable.242 Because this decision appears
to be a quantity of benefits determination, NYLCare will likely argue
(and the court is likely to agree), that the plaintiffs may not sue under
the Act.243 This is a likely result even though the benefit denial had a
great impact upon the quality of care Mr. Plocica received. 44
IV. CONCLUSION
Although many have viewed the Act as the model of managed care
entity liability for other states considering such legislation, the model
does not provide the full protection consumers have sought from the
managed care industry.245 By taking the first step to impose liability
upon managed care entities, Texas has started to address the concerns
of health care consumers and, at a minimum, Texas has started the
long process of stripping managed care entities of the defenses and
immunities they have enjoyed.246 The question likely to be addressed
239. See Stoeckl, supra note 30, at 403-09; Chan, supra note 23, at 221-23.
240. See Stoeckl, supra note 30, at 403-09; Chan, supra note 23, at 221-23.
241. See Stoeckl, supra note 30, at 403-09; Chan, supra note 23, at 223-24.
242. See Chan, supra note 23, at 223-24 (noting that this distinction may
actually be false).
243. See id. This case also presents the typical situation in which it is dif-
ficult to distinguish the quality from the quantity of benefits. See Jordan, supra
note 30, at 18.
244. See Chan, supra note 23, at 223-24.
245. See Stoeckl, supra note 30, at 403-09 (noting that the Act is not full
protection); Chan, supra note 23, at 223-24 (noting problems in distinguishing
between quality and quantity of benefits).
246. See Stoeckl, supra note 30, at 403-09 (noting that the Act does not
provide full protection); Jordan, supra note 30, at 18 (noting that because
Texas Health Care Liability Act
and answered by the court in Plocica is that, although Texas seems to
be listening to the concerns of its health care consumers, how much
has it really heard?
ERISA law already generally recognized that a denial of benefits claim is pre-
empted while a quality of benefits claim is not, the Corporate Health decision
did not afford new protection).
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